![\"\"](\"https://content.ibisworld.com/media/5ijdzq53/uschinatechwar1.png?rmode=max&width=720\")
The competition between the United States and China for technological supremacy is no longer abstract or secondary. When four individuals were arrested in November 2025 for smuggling hundreds of Nvidia AI chips to China through Southeast Asia, federal prosecutors revealed what the intelligence community has long understood: advanced semiconductors are treated like nuclear weapons, with export controls enforced accordingly.
\n\n
Just weeks earlier, Beijing announced sweeping restrictions on rare earth exports in October. Meanwhile, Washington blocked Nvidia's sale of degraded AI chips to China. For both nations, technological capability has become the currency of power and influence. The ability to design, manufacture and deploy advanced semiconductors now determines military strength, economic competitiveness and capacity to project influence globally. Neither nation can match the other through traditional military spending alone. The competition centers on which controls the technologies that will define warfare, economic production and geopolitical influence for the next two decades.
\n\n
This fierce competition for technological supremacy has exposed vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that threaten the military and economic security of the United States and its allies. Taiwan, which produces 70% of the world's most advanced semiconductors below seven nanometers, has become a geopolitical chokepoint. The entire military infrastructure of the United States and its allies depend on the political stability of an island of 23.0 million people, located fewer than 100 miles from China's coast.
\n\n
But Taiwan does not operate in isolation. Its dominance in advanced chips is embedded within a tightly coupled network of critical dependencies. For example, the Netherlands' ASML maintains a near monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the only tools capable of producing cutting-edge chips. Meanwhile, Japan controls over 80% of the global photoresist supply. Disruption to any link in this chain would compromise military capability and economic competitiveness.
\n\n
This vulnerability emerged through decades of corporate decisions driven by labor costs and efficiency optimization. For example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) became premier mainly through American outsourcing. China recognized this vulnerability before American policymakers did. As such, Beijing invested heavily in Huawei semiconductor development and built massive data centers powered by subsidized electricity across multiple provinces. Moreover, Chinese companies developed AI systems that compensate for restricted access through computational scale and parallel processing.
\n\n
This semiconductor dependency directly translates into military vulnerability. Advanced precision weapons depend on the latest AI chips. Satellite guidance systems, radar processing, autonomous systems and hypersonic weapons all require cutting-edge semiconductors. A disruption to Taiwan's production doesn't just impact commercial AI, it also degrades American military capability. China's strategy implicitly recognizes this: by threatening Taiwan while simultaneously building its own semiconductor capacity, Beijing creates a no-win scenario for Washington. Accepting Chinese control of TSMC means surrendering technological military superiority. Defending Taiwan militarily risks direct superpower conflict. Finding a middle path requires either rapid semiconductor reshoring or accepting strategic vulnerability for a decade.
\n\n
The transformation of technology supply chains from commercial networks into critical geopolitical assets represents a fundamental shift in how nations conceptualize power and vulnerability. Several structural vulnerabilities have emerged as critical pressure points that neither nation can easily resolve.
\n\n
![\"\"](\"https://content.ibisworld.com/media/wiyhvnol/uschinatechwar2.png?rmode=max&width=720\")
China produces approximately 69% of rare earth minerals. Moreover, Beijing processes the vast majority of rare earth elements essential for military systems, including magnets, semiconductors and optical devices. When China announced rare earth export restrictions in April 2025 and expanded them in October to include foreign made products containing Chinese materials, it exercised strategic power that directly constrains American military modernization.
\n\n
Export controls have fractured global technology flows. For example, US export restrictions cost Nvidia $5.5 billion early in 2025. In response to US restrictions, China prioritized domestic chipmakers through government allocation at Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and by offering energy subsidies to data centers using Chinese-made chips.
\n\n
These disruptions cascade into defense timelines. The United States faces bottlenecks in rare earth supplies essential for missile systems and advanced fighter aircraft. China confronts constraints in accessing cutting edge AI accelerators necessary for autonomous weapons systems.
\n\n
This competition for technological dominance now manifests across at least two critical domains where advanced semiconductors determine outcomes: AI-powered autonomous systems and space-based surveillance networks.
\n\n
Future warfare will be increasingly dominated by autonomous weapons. The Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft program envisions loyal wingman drones controlled by AI algorithms flying alongside sixth-generation F-47 fighters, with first flight targeted for 2028. The $140.0 billion Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program requires similar autonomous capabilities. Naval unmanned systems, hypersonic weapons and autonomous battlefield systems all demand continuous access to advanced AI accelerators. These are precisely the same semiconductors subject to US export controls.
\n\n
In space, China's military presence has expanded dramatically. China's on-orbit presence has grown 927 percent since 2015, with the People's Liberation Army now operating over 510 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-capable satellites. Even more significantly, China is deploying a planned 15,000-satellite network by 2030. This expansion depends entirely on advanced semiconductors. Satellite systems require cutting-edge chips for signal processing, data transmission and autonomous operation. The sensors that collect intelligence, the processors that analyze imagery in real-time and the communication systems that relay data across the network all depend on advanced semiconductors.
\n\n
![\"\"](\"https://content.ibisworld.com/media/efajcr5l/shutterstock_2599523555.jpg?rmode=max&width=720\")
Both nations recognize that semiconductor access determines military capability. The United States cannot afford constraints on advanced chips. China must currently compensate through alternative strategies and massive deployment scale.
\n\n
Recognizing that semiconductor access determines strategic power, the United States and its allies have begun restructuring global supply chains to reduce dependence on vulnerable chokepoints. This represents a fundamental reordering of the post-Cold War economic system, replacing globalized efficiency with strategic resilience.
\n\n
The CHIPS and Science Act represents the single-largest industrial policy intervention since post-World War II reconstruction. The 2022 legislation authorized approximately $280 billion in new spending through 2027, with significant funding dedicated to onshoring semiconductor manufacturing. Spurred by the CHIPS Act, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is building three plants in Arizona, while Samsung has established advanced production in Texas. The Act restricts funding recipients from expanding semiconductor manufacturing in China by more than 5%, explicitly using economic incentives to reshape global production geography away from potential adversaries.
\n\n
Beyond semiconductors, the United States and allies are coordinating technology development across multiple domains. AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, has expanded beyond submarines to encompass AI, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities and hypersonic systems. Japan and South Korea agreed to deeper defense cooperation in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems and aerospace technologies. NATO allies endorsed spending 5% of GDP on security by 2035, with 3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on security infrastructure. Moreover, the NATO Innovation Fund established a 28-country platform for dual-use technologies.
\n\n
![\"\"](\"https://content.ibisworld.com/media/hufotkql/shutterstock_2445404713.jpg?rmode=max&width=720\")
This creates a multi-hub ecosystem designed to reduce dependence on external supply chains and force China to operate outside the Western technology sphere. Countries that want to participate in advanced chip production increasingly face only one viable path, running through the United States and allied partners. China has responded with comprehensive counterstrategies extending across Asia and Africa. The Belt and Road Initiative has reached $1.308 trillion in construction spending and investments globally since 2013, emphasizing manufacturing and energy infrastructure, creating strategic dependencies that impact American policy options. The result is not a resolution but rather a bifurcation of the global technology order into competing blocs, each attempting to secure its own supply chains while denying resources to the adversary.
","TimeToRead":8,"FinalWord":null,"KeyTakeaways":null,"DatePublished":"2025-12-11T00:00:00Z","DatePublishedTimestamp":0,"DateFormatted":"December 11, 2025","UrlSlug":"/us-china-tech-war/","SeoTitle":"The New Tech Cold War: How US-China Competition Is Rewriting Global Defense","SeoDescription":"The US-China rivalry over semiconductors, AI and rare earth elements is reshaping global supply chains and defense strategies.","SeoImageUrl":"/media/cozh5p0k/socialmedia-logo.png","Tags":["Defense","Innovation","Semiconductor","Manufacturing","Business Growth","Economic Growth","Growth","Supply Chain"],"Sectors":null,"Toc":null,"Culture":"en","IsFeatured":false,"IsHidden":false},"Item2": {"Id":7997,"Key":"452db73d-da72-4397-9634-e47200a12ddd","Title":"The New Tech Cold War: How US-China Competition Is Rewriting Global Defense","Country":"United States","CountryId":1,"AuthorId":3406,"AuthorName":"Vlad Khaustovich","AuthorTitle":"Industry Research Analyst","AuthorPhoto":"/media/fibibcti/image-10.png","AuthorBio":"Industry research analyst with a background in economics and business administration. ","Image":null,"CategoryId":1126,"CategoryName":"Analyst Insights","Persona":null,"Content":"The competition between the United States and China for technological supremacy is no longer abstract or secondary. When four individuals were arrested in November 2025 for smuggling hundreds of Nvidia AI chips to China through Southeast Asia, federal prosecutors revealed what the intelligence community has long understood: advanced semiconductors are treated like nuclear weapons, with export controls enforced accordingly.
\n\n
Just weeks earlier, Beijing announced sweeping restrictions on rare earth exports in October. Meanwhile, Washington blocked Nvidia's sale of degraded AI chips to China. For both nations, technological capability has become the currency of power and influence. The ability to design, manufacture and deploy advanced semiconductors now determines military strength, economic competitiveness and capacity to project influence globally. Neither nation can match the other through traditional military spending alone. The competition centers on which controls the technologies that will define warfare, economic production and geopolitical influence for the next two decades.
\n\n
This fierce competition for technological supremacy has exposed vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that threaten the military and economic security of the United States and its allies. Taiwan, which produces 70% of the world's most advanced semiconductors below seven nanometers, has become a geopolitical chokepoint. The entire military infrastructure of the United States and its allies depend on the political stability of an island of 23.0 million people, located fewer than 100 miles from China's coast.
\n\n
But Taiwan does not operate in isolation. Its dominance in advanced chips is embedded within a tightly coupled network of critical dependencies. For example, the Netherlands' ASML maintains a near monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the only tools capable of producing cutting-edge chips. Meanwhile, Japan controls over 80% of the global photoresist supply. Disruption to any link in this chain would compromise military capability and economic competitiveness.
\n\n
This vulnerability emerged through decades of corporate decisions driven by labor costs and efficiency optimization. For example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) became premier mainly through American outsourcing. China recognized this vulnerability before American policymakers did. As such, Beijing invested heavily in Huawei semiconductor development and built massive data centers powered by subsidized electricity across multiple provinces. Moreover, Chinese companies developed AI systems that compensate for restricted access through computational scale and parallel processing.
\n\n
This semiconductor dependency directly translates into military vulnerability. Advanced precision weapons depend on the latest AI chips. Satellite guidance systems, radar processing, autonomous systems and hypersonic weapons all require cutting-edge semiconductors. A disruption to Taiwan's production doesn't just impact commercial AI, it also degrades American military capability. China's strategy implicitly recognizes this: by threatening Taiwan while simultaneously building its own semiconductor capacity, Beijing creates a no-win scenario for Washington. Accepting Chinese control of TSMC means surrendering technological military superiority. Defending Taiwan militarily risks direct superpower conflict. Finding a middle path requires either rapid semiconductor reshoring or accepting strategic vulnerability for a decade.
\n\n
The transformation of technology supply chains from commercial networks into critical geopolitical assets represents a fundamental shift in how nations conceptualize power and vulnerability. Several structural vulnerabilities have emerged as critical pressure points that neither nation can easily resolve.
\n\n
China produces approximately 69% of rare earth minerals. Moreover, Beijing processes the vast majority of rare earth elements essential for military systems, including magnets, semiconductors and optical devices. When China announced rare earth export restrictions in April 2025 and expanded them in October to include foreign made products containing Chinese materials, it exercised strategic power that directly constrains American military modernization.
\n\n
Export controls have fractured global technology flows. For example, US export restrictions cost Nvidia $5.5 billion early in 2025. In response to US restrictions, China prioritized domestic chipmakers through government allocation at Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and by offering energy subsidies to data centers using Chinese-made chips.
\n\n
These disruptions cascade into defense timelines. The United States faces bottlenecks in rare earth supplies essential for missile systems and advanced fighter aircraft. China confronts constraints in accessing cutting edge AI accelerators necessary for autonomous weapons systems.
\n\n
This competition for technological dominance now manifests across at least two critical domains where advanced semiconductors determine outcomes: AI-powered autonomous systems and space-based surveillance networks.
\n\n
Future warfare will be increasingly dominated by autonomous weapons. The Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft program envisions loyal wingman drones controlled by AI algorithms flying alongside sixth-generation F-47 fighters, with first flight targeted for 2028. The $140.0 billion Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program requires similar autonomous capabilities. Naval unmanned systems, hypersonic weapons and autonomous battlefield systems all demand continuous access to advanced AI accelerators. These are precisely the same semiconductors subject to US export controls.
\n\n
In space, China's military presence has expanded dramatically. China's on-orbit presence has grown 927 percent since 2015, with the People's Liberation Army now operating over 510 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-capable satellites. Even more significantly, China is deploying a planned 15,000-satellite network by 2030. This expansion depends entirely on advanced semiconductors. Satellite systems require cutting-edge chips for signal processing, data transmission and autonomous operation. The sensors that collect intelligence, the processors that analyze imagery in real-time and the communication systems that relay data across the network all depend on advanced semiconductors.
\n\n
Both nations recognize that semiconductor access determines military capability. The United States cannot afford constraints on advanced chips. China must currently compensate through alternative strategies and massive deployment scale.
\n\n
Recognizing that semiconductor access determines strategic power, the United States and its allies have begun restructuring global supply chains to reduce dependence on vulnerable chokepoints. This represents a fundamental reordering of the post-Cold War economic system, replacing globalized efficiency with strategic resilience.
\n\n
The CHIPS and Science Act represents the single-largest industrial policy intervention since post-World War II reconstruction. The 2022 legislation authorized approximately $280 billion in new spending through 2027, with significant funding dedicated to onshoring semiconductor manufacturing. Spurred by the CHIPS Act, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is building three plants in Arizona, while Samsung has established advanced production in Texas. The Act restricts funding recipients from expanding semiconductor manufacturing in China by more than 5%, explicitly using economic incentives to reshape global production geography away from potential adversaries.
\n\n
Beyond semiconductors, the United States and allies are coordinating technology development across multiple domains. AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, has expanded beyond submarines to encompass AI, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities and hypersonic systems. Japan and South Korea agreed to deeper defense cooperation in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems and aerospace technologies. NATO allies endorsed spending 5% of GDP on security by 2035, with 3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on security infrastructure. Moreover, the NATO Innovation Fund established a 28-country platform for dual-use technologies.
\n\n
This creates a multi-hub ecosystem designed to reduce dependence on external supply chains and force China to operate outside the Western technology sphere. Countries that want to participate in advanced chip production increasingly face only one viable path, running through the United States and allied partners. China has responded with comprehensive counterstrategies extending across Asia and Africa. The Belt and Road Initiative has reached $1.308 trillion in construction spending and investments globally since 2013, emphasizing manufacturing and energy infrastructure, creating strategic dependencies that impact American policy options. The result is not a resolution but rather a bifurcation of the global technology order into competing blocs, each attempting to secure its own supply chains while denying resources to the adversary.
","TimeToRead":8,"FinalWord":null,"KeyTakeaways":null,"DatePublished":"2025-12-11T00:00:00Z","DatePublishedTimestamp":0,"DateFormatted":"December 11, 2025","UrlSlug":"/us-china-tech-war/","SeoTitle":"The New Tech Cold War: How US-China Competition Is Rewriting Global Defense","SeoDescription":"The US-China rivalry over semiconductors, AI and rare earth elements is reshaping global supply chains and defense strategies.","SeoImageUrl":"/media/cozh5p0k/socialmedia-logo.png","Tags":["Defense","Innovation","Semiconductor","Manufacturing","Business Growth","Economic Growth","Growth","Supply Chain"],"Sectors":null,"Toc":null,"Culture":"en","IsFeatured":false,"IsHidden":false},"Item3": {"Id":7997,"Key":"452db73d-da72-4397-9634-e47200a12ddd","Title":"The New Tech Cold War: How US-China Competition Is Rewriting Global Defense","Country":"United States","CountryId":1,"AuthorId":3406,"AuthorName":"Vlad Khaustovich","AuthorTitle":"Industry Research Analyst","AuthorPhoto":"/media/fibibcti/image-10.png","AuthorBio":"Industry research analyst with a background in economics and business administration. ","Image":null,"CategoryId":1126,"CategoryName":"Analyst Insights","Persona":null,"Content":"The competition between the United States and China for technological supremacy is no longer abstract or secondary. When four individuals were arrested in November 2025 for smuggling hundreds of Nvidia AI chips to China through Southeast Asia, federal prosecutors revealed what the intelligence community has long understood: advanced semiconductors are treated like nuclear weapons, with export controls enforced accordingly.
\n\n
Just weeks earlier, Beijing announced sweeping restrictions on rare earth exports in October. Meanwhile, Washington blocked Nvidia's sale of degraded AI chips to China. For both nations, technological capability has become the currency of power and influence. The ability to design, manufacture and deploy advanced semiconductors now determines military strength, economic competitiveness and capacity to project influence globally. Neither nation can match the other through traditional military spending alone. The competition centers on which controls the technologies that will define warfare, economic production and geopolitical influence for the next two decades.
\n\n
This fierce competition for technological supremacy has exposed vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that threaten the military and economic security of the United States and its allies. Taiwan, which produces 70% of the world's most advanced semiconductors below seven nanometers, has become a geopolitical chokepoint. The entire military infrastructure of the United States and its allies depend on the political stability of an island of 23.0 million people, located fewer than 100 miles from China's coast.
\n\n
But Taiwan does not operate in isolation. Its dominance in advanced chips is embedded within a tightly coupled network of critical dependencies. For example, the Netherlands' ASML maintains a near monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the only tools capable of producing cutting-edge chips. Meanwhile, Japan controls over 80% of the global photoresist supply. Disruption to any link in this chain would compromise military capability and economic competitiveness.
\n\n
This vulnerability emerged through decades of corporate decisions driven by labor costs and efficiency optimization. For example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) became premier mainly through American outsourcing. China recognized this vulnerability before American policymakers did. As such, Beijing invested heavily in Huawei semiconductor development and built massive data centers powered by subsidized electricity across multiple provinces. Moreover, Chinese companies developed AI systems that compensate for restricted access through computational scale and parallel processing.
\n\n
This semiconductor dependency directly translates into military vulnerability. Advanced precision weapons depend on the latest AI chips. Satellite guidance systems, radar processing, autonomous systems and hypersonic weapons all require cutting-edge semiconductors. A disruption to Taiwan's production doesn't just impact commercial AI, it also degrades American military capability. China's strategy implicitly recognizes this: by threatening Taiwan while simultaneously building its own semiconductor capacity, Beijing creates a no-win scenario for Washington. Accepting Chinese control of TSMC means surrendering technological military superiority. Defending Taiwan militarily risks direct superpower conflict. Finding a middle path requires either rapid semiconductor reshoring or accepting strategic vulnerability for a decade.
\n\n
The transformation of technology supply chains from commercial networks into critical geopolitical assets represents a fundamental shift in how nations conceptualize power and vulnerability. Several structural vulnerabilities have emerged as critical pressure points that neither nation can easily resolve.
\n\n
China produces approximately 69% of rare earth minerals. Moreover, Beijing processes the vast majority of rare earth elements essential for military systems, including magnets, semiconductors and optical devices. When China announced rare earth export restrictions in April 2025 and expanded them in October to include foreign made products containing Chinese materials, it exercised strategic power that directly constrains American military modernization.
\n\n
Export controls have fractured global technology flows. For example, US export restrictions cost Nvidia $5.5 billion early in 2025. In response to US restrictions, China prioritized domestic chipmakers through government allocation at Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and by offering energy subsidies to data centers using Chinese-made chips.
\n\n
These disruptions cascade into defense timelines. The United States faces bottlenecks in rare earth supplies essential for missile systems and advanced fighter aircraft. China confronts constraints in accessing cutting edge AI accelerators necessary for autonomous weapons systems.
\n\n
This competition for technological dominance now manifests across at least two critical domains where advanced semiconductors determine outcomes: AI-powered autonomous systems and space-based surveillance networks.
\n\n
Future warfare will be increasingly dominated by autonomous weapons. The Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft program envisions loyal wingman drones controlled by AI algorithms flying alongside sixth-generation F-47 fighters, with first flight targeted for 2028. The $140.0 billion Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program requires similar autonomous capabilities. Naval unmanned systems, hypersonic weapons and autonomous battlefield systems all demand continuous access to advanced AI accelerators. These are precisely the same semiconductors subject to US export controls.
\n\n
In space, China's military presence has expanded dramatically. China's on-orbit presence has grown 927 percent since 2015, with the People's Liberation Army now operating over 510 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-capable satellites. Even more significantly, China is deploying a planned 15,000-satellite network by 2030. This expansion depends entirely on advanced semiconductors. Satellite systems require cutting-edge chips for signal processing, data transmission and autonomous operation. The sensors that collect intelligence, the processors that analyze imagery in real-time and the communication systems that relay data across the network all depend on advanced semiconductors.
\n\n
Both nations recognize that semiconductor access determines military capability. The United States cannot afford constraints on advanced chips. China must currently compensate through alternative strategies and massive deployment scale.
\n\n
Recognizing that semiconductor access determines strategic power, the United States and its allies have begun restructuring global supply chains to reduce dependence on vulnerable chokepoints. This represents a fundamental reordering of the post-Cold War economic system, replacing globalized efficiency with strategic resilience.
\n\n
The CHIPS and Science Act represents the single-largest industrial policy intervention since post-World War II reconstruction. The 2022 legislation authorized approximately $280 billion in new spending through 2027, with significant funding dedicated to onshoring semiconductor manufacturing. Spurred by the CHIPS Act, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is building three plants in Arizona, while Samsung has established advanced production in Texas. The Act restricts funding recipients from expanding semiconductor manufacturing in China by more than 5%, explicitly using economic incentives to reshape global production geography away from potential adversaries.
\n\n
Beyond semiconductors, the United States and allies are coordinating technology development across multiple domains. AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, has expanded beyond submarines to encompass AI, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities and hypersonic systems. Japan and South Korea agreed to deeper defense cooperation in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems and aerospace technologies. NATO allies endorsed spending 5% of GDP on security by 2035, with 3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on security infrastructure. Moreover, the NATO Innovation Fund established a 28-country platform for dual-use technologies.
\n\n
This creates a multi-hub ecosystem designed to reduce dependence on external supply chains and force China to operate outside the Western technology sphere. Countries that want to participate in advanced chip production increasingly face only one viable path, running through the United States and allied partners. China has responded with comprehensive counterstrategies extending across Asia and Africa. The Belt and Road Initiative has reached $1.308 trillion in construction spending and investments globally since 2013, emphasizing manufacturing and energy infrastructure, creating strategic dependencies that impact American policy options. The result is not a resolution but rather a bifurcation of the global technology order into competing blocs, each attempting to secure its own supply chains while denying resources to the adversary.
","TimeToRead":8,"FinalWord":null,"KeyTakeaways":null,"DatePublished":"2025-12-11T00:00:00Z","DatePublishedTimestamp":0,"DateFormatted":"December 11, 2025","UrlSlug":"/us-china-tech-war/","SeoTitle":"The New Tech Cold War: How US-China Competition Is Rewriting Global Defense","SeoDescription":"The US-China rivalry over semiconductors, AI and rare earth elements is reshaping global supply chains and defense strategies.","SeoImageUrl":"/media/cozh5p0k/socialmedia-logo.png","Tags":["Defense","Innovation","Semiconductor","Manufacturing","Business Growth","Economic Growth","Growth","Supply Chain"],"Sectors":null,"Toc":null,"Culture":"en","IsFeatured":false,"IsHidden":false}}}